Equilibrium Selection and the Rate of Convergence in Coordination Games with Simultaneous Play

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in the recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire population. In these games, payoffs whence best replies are determined by a summary statistic of the population strategy profile. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection depends crucially on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the underlying stage game can be declared stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant best responses. Furthermore, we show that if the best response mapping is sufficiently asymmetric, the expected waiting time until the unique stochastically stable state is reached is of the same order as the mutation rate, even in the limit as the population size grows to infinity.equilibrium selection; stochastic stability; waiting time; rate of convergence

Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information

We investigate a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. In the presence of complete information about individuals' valuations for the public good, the difference between the equilibrium outcomes of a subscription game and a contribution game is not significant. However, there is both casual evidence from the fund-raising literature and experimental evidence that subscription games are ``superior '', i.e., a refund increases the chance of providing the good given that it is efficient to do so. Our analysis shows that this is indeed the case in the presence of incomplete information. We compute a symmetric equilibrium for the subscription game and show that it is not necessarily efficient. This inefficiency stems from the difficulties arising in coordinating to overcome the free-rider problem in the presence of incomplete information. Although it is well known that informational disparities impose limits on the efficiency of outcomes, the novel feature of our analysis is to explicitly model the resulting trade-off --- when deciding how much to contribute towards the public good --- between increasing the likelihood of provision and creating incentives for free-riding by the other player. Moreover, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a given range of the fixed cost of provision and for a family of distributions.public goods; incomplete information; continuous distribution

A categorical framework for concurrent, anticipatory systems

A categorical semantic domain is constructed for Petri nets which satisfies the diagonal compositionality requirement with respect to anticipations, i.e., Petri nets are equipped with a compositional anticipation mechanism (vertical compositionality) that distributes through net combinators (horizontal compositionality). The anticipation mechanism is based on graph transformations (single pushout approach). A finitely bicomplete category of partial Petri nets and partial morphisms is introduced. Classes of transformations stand for anticipations. The composition of anticipations (i.e., composition of pushouts) is defined, leading to a category of nets and anticipations which is also complete and cocomplete. Since the anticipation operation composes, the vertical compositionality requirement of Petri nets is achieved. Then, it is proven that the anticipation also satisfies the horizontal compositionality requirement. A specification grammar stands for a system specification and the corresponding induced subcategory of nets and anticipation's stands for ali possible dynamic anticipation's ofthe system (objects) and their relationship (morphims)

Marked petri nets within a categorial framework

Well know categories of Petri nets lack coproducts and some re strictioné on nets, morphisms or initial markings are required in or der to guarantee the existence of colimits. Categories of Petri nets equipped with a set of initial markings (instead of a single initial marking) are introduced. It is shown that the proposed categories of nets are complete and cocomplete. Moreover,interpretations of limits and colimits are adequate for expressing semantics of concurrent sys tems. Examples ofstructuring and modeling of behavior of nets using categoria! constructions based on limits and colimits are provided

Unions and the Economic Performanceof Brazilian Establishments

Using a pooled sample, this paper indicates that unions seem to affect the economic performance of Brazilian establishments, especially in terms of profitability, employment and productivity. Unions tend to reduce profitability, whereas the relationship between union density and productivity, employment and average wages seems to be concave. These performance indicators first rise with union density up to a certain density level (usually about 50 percent) and then start to decline. These results indicate that some unionism may be good for the plants` economic performance, although too much unionism may start having negative effects.

Corruption and Auctions

We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid to match the loser's bid in exchange for a bribe. In the second arrangement, the auctioneer approaches the loser and offers him the possibility of matching the winner's bid in exchange for a bribe. While oral auctions are corruption free under the two arrangements, corruption affects both bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue in a first­price auction